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"THE CENSORING OF LORENZO SHERWOOD:
THE POLITICS OF RAILROADS, SLAVERY AND SOUTHERNISM
IN ANTEBELLUM TEXAS"
by John Maretta

Prior to the late 1850s, Texans' values, attitudes, and interests more often
reflected those of their former home states than those of their new one. Texans
by and large were recent emigres clustered into homogenous groups that
preserved native folkways and ideals. Less than one-fourth of the population
in 1860 could claim residence before statehood in 1845. The immigrants'
cohesiveness, the dramatically varied Texas climate and terrain, and the lack
of adequate transportation in many portions of the state made the economic
interests of Texas as diverse as its population sources. Germans in the Hill
Country, tejanos in San Antonio, cotton planters from the Lower South along
the Brazos or Colorado rivers, or Yankee merchants in Houston or Galveston,
had different concerns and values. Then, during the 1850s, a consensus
emerged in Texas that reflected the ideology and partisanship of the Lower
South. On the surface such empathy seemed impossible. Climate, geography,
history, population makeup, and regional characteristics all made Texas appear
different from the South, but these differences were not enough to prevent
Texans from identifying with the other cotton growing states. In the dozen
years after annexation in 1845, the economy, culture, and ideology of the
plantation South extended beyond East Texas to influence Texans in all
regions of the state. Several years before Texans voted to secede from the
Union the majority had become convinced that their society's future status,
stability, and prosperity depended in some way upon slavery and the
promotion of railroad construction that would further stimulate an already
growing cotton-based market economy.
Southern loyalty symbolized more than just a proper reverence for
slavery. As Lower South ideology captured more Southern hearts and minds,
those opposed to such extremism risked the same sort of public censure or
even violence that the most ardent of antislavery men received at the hands of
Southern vigilants. Southern radicals commonly applied the epithet abolitionist to political enemies who questioned or resisted any expression of
Southern rights other than that of the lower South ethos. The same methods
used to intimidate or punish racial disloyalty proved equally effective in
castigating political dissenters or any other perceived violator of "Southern
principles." Southerners were determined to purge from their society individuals or ideas that threatened their social, political, or economic institutions,
These vigilant Southerners used a variety of tactics to suppress heresy. or to
convince their friends and colleagues of the error of their ways. As a result of
their increased identificatl0n with the Lower South, Texans displayed the same
zeal for ferreting out and disciplining individuals or groups who violated their
perception of what should be every white Texans' attitude toward the peculiar
John Maretta li\'es in
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institution. Such was the experience of Galvestonian Lorenzo Sherwood and
his supporters during Texas' fIrst intrastate "railroad war."
There were two things Texas needed to utilize the millions of acres of
potential cotton land: slaves and railroads. The slaves could be obtained by
reopening the African slave trade; the railroads could and would be built.
According to E.H. Cushing, editor of the Houston Telegraph, Texas had close
to eighteen million acres suitable for cotton cultivation. Cushing claimed that
it would be "criminal folly" to deprive the state of such potential economic
greatness. Though Cushing's figures were exaggerated, the Department of
Agriculture's Bureau of the Census for 1900 shows that Texans planted
7,360,000 acres in cotton and produced 3,438,000 bales,! These figures
illustrate the potential in Lone Star cotton production. It is no wonder that
throughout the 1850s leading citizens, businessmen, planters, and lawyers
flooded local newspapers with long missives insisting that Texas' future prosperity and greatness could not be realized without the building of a vast railway network and the importation of African slaves. Although all Texans
agreed on the need for railroads, a great political contest erupted in which the
politics of slavery and southernism detennined the olltcome.
Railroad construction in Texas began in earnest with the chartering in
1850 of the Buffalo Bayou, Brazos and Colorado line. This road was constructed to bring the staples of the lower Brazos and Colorado valleys to port
at Harrisburg. A great boon was the state's acquisition of $10,000,000 in
United States bonds. This money was part of the Compromise "package" of
1850; Texas would receive the money for relinquishing claim to eastern New
Mexico and other portions of the Southwest. In ] 851 Governor Peter H. Bell
called for part of the funds to be used in a state-wide internal improvements
enterprise that promoted rail and water transportation. 2

In September 1852 a railroad convention, meeting in Austin, supported
Bell's suggestion. The delegates proposed legislation to authorize loans of
boundary-settlement bonds to railroad companies. The amount received by the
companies was restricted to $12,000 per mile of track. The convention also
called for legislation that awarded companies 5,000 acres of land for each mile
of road constructed. 3
Not all Tex.ans approved of the idea of state aid to private railroad enterprises. 1\vo months before the Austin convention, promoters of a state-constructed and owned thousand-mile railroad complex met in Galveston. The
proposal's most passionate advocate was Galveston attorney Lorenzo Sherwood, who became one of the most publicly maligned men in antebellum
Texas because of his "peculiar financial notions" and alleged abolitionism.
Sherwood was born in New York in 1808, became a lawyer at the age of
twenty, and for several years served in the state legislature. Before migrating
to Texas, Sherwood helped draft a new state constitution for New York in
1846.
While participating in the state constitutional convention, Sherwood
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gained a reputation as an opponent of private canal and railroad enterprises
and as an advocate for utilizing state credit to finance internal improvements.
Sherwood believed that it was wrong for the public to be burdened with the
large interest and service costs that private promoters charged to finance,
build, and operate needed transportation systems. For his time, Sherwood
possessed a remarkable understanding of economics, and much to his adversaries' annoyance~ exposed their peculations and sophistries by presenting
their financial statements to the public. 4
In 1846 Sherwood moved his wife, son, and law practice to Galveston
and within a few years his firm was handling the affairs of some of the most
prominent men in Texas as well as foreign shipping firms carrying trade into
Texas. Over the years, Sherwood earned the enmity of several powerful
Galvestonians such as Samuel May Williams and Robert Mills, as well as the
open hostility of the several railroad-promoting combines then operating in the
Lone Star state. 5 By originating and advocating the State Plan, Lorenzo Sherwood set the stage for a rancorous intrastate struggle over competing ideas
regarding railroad policy.
The Corporate or State Loan Plan was favored by the majority of railroad
developers throughout the state, with the most determined efforts to boost the
scheme emanating from Houston. Entrepreneurs, led by William March Rice,
Thomas William House, and Henry Sampson, saw railroad construction as
their long-awaited opportunity to dethrone Galveston and make Houston the
state's leading entrepot. Houstonians, along with other advocates of the plan,
wanted the system to be built by private funds. "Corporators" urged the state
to grant substantial portions of the public domain as well the extension of
loans as incentives to those entrepreneurs willing to undertake the risk of
constructing the state's rail system. The promoters recommended that sixteen
sections of land and advances as high as $10,000 be given to the companies
for each mile of track actually laid. The corporators maintained that generous
land grants and loans were essential if Texas hoped to attract domestic
investors who would supply the additional money to complete the network. 6
The majority of speculators behind the Corporate Plan were a loose combination of transcontinental "paper railroaders" - N ortheastem "stock jobbers"
- out to make handsome returns on Texas railroad bonds circulated in both
Europe and the United States. Houston's merchant princes also were attracted
to the plan because they saw an opportunity to augment their incomes from a
rail system that tied their city to the transcontinental system then being
discussed in Congress.
The plan gained initial momentum with the election of Elisha M. Pease
as governor in 1853. Pease had endorsed the plan during the campaign,
promising as governor that he would support loans and land grants to promote
private railroad construction in Texas. Although willing to advance state
assistance to private railroad development, Pease simultaneously pushed
legislation to protect the state from purely speculative railroad schemes. His
program called for all investors to pay a percentage of their stock upon sub-
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scription, and no charters would be granted until companies demonstrated
possession of sufficient cash to begin construction. Contracts also would
designate the exact terminals on the road, the date construction was to begin,
and the number of miles of track to be laid annually until the line was completed. Despite his progressive proposals, Pease was committed to private
railroad construction sustained by state resources. Thus, in 1854 Pease signed
into law one of the most important pieces of antebellum railroad legislation: a
bill authorizing the state to grant to all companies thereafter sixteen sections
of land for each mile of track laid.
7

The majority of Galveston's business and professional classes supported
the Corporate Plan even though Sherwood's State Plan favored the Island City.
The mercantile and banking interests of both Houston and Galveston championed the Corporate Plan, hoping to profit by selling railroad contractors
essential supplies. Galvestonians, however, were confronted with an interesting predicamenc they opposed both a state-controlled system and a Houstondominated railway, even though Sherwood's plan intimated that the line would
be Galveston-centcred. g
As the railroad debate intensified, it wa~ obvious to all Texans that regardless of which plan was adopted it would either be Houston or Galveston
money that financed and controlled the system. Much to Houstonians' delight,
Galveston's leaders had no real desire to control the network or any interest in
supporting a plan that benefited their city_ They were content with their port
monopoly. Unfortunately for Galveston, self-interest rather than public
interest prevailed among the city's elite, who saw in the Corporate Plan
another means of securing their personal fortunes. The zeal with which Galveston's city fathers supported the scheme eventually made Houston the railroad focus of Texas and the center of a Southern transcontinental system and
relegated the Island City to a satellite status.
Houston corporate boosters were especially pleased by Governor Pease's
decision to pursue his predecessor's recommendation that Texas secure a
segment of the possible Southern transcontinental railroad route. In 1853, with
Pease's approval, the legislature passed the Mississippi and Pacific Act, which
instructed the governor to contract with a company to build an 800-mile road
westward through the state at the 32nd parallel. The bill also stipulated that the
state would donate twenty sections of public land to the contractors for every
mBe of track laid, which would total eleven million acres. The company
awarded the contract also had to deposit $300,000 in specie or federal or s.tate
securities with the state which would be forfeited if at Least fifty miles of road
were not built within eighteen months. 9
Only one association, the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company of New
York, responded. Its directors were rather prominent individuals: Robert 1.
Walker, former secretary of the treasury during the Polk Administration;
Gecrgia political leader and railroad speculator, T. Butler King; and Anson
Jones, long-time Texas lawmaker, entrepreneur, and last president of the
Republic of Texas. Within a few months several respected publications such
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as the New York Examiner and the American Railroad Journal reported that
the company was a facade for a group of ruthless and penniless speculators out
to swindle honest investors to their railroad schemes. After learning of the
company's dealings, Pease had reservations about awarding them the contract.
After months of negotiation and warnings from Senators Thomas J. Rusk and
Sam Houston to "not let these men fasten themselves upon Texas," the
governor decided in November 1854 to nullify the state's contract with the
consortium after the company failed to deposit the required $300,OOO.11J
Although northern and eastern Texans criticized Pease's decision, the
majority of citizens applauded the governor's firmness. Public approval of
Pease's resistance to the machinations of the A&P helped him to win
reelection in 1855. However, Pease's experience with the company made him
a less sanguine supporter of the Corporate Plan, Pease almost committed
political suicide just before the gubernatorial campaign of 1855 began when
he completely reversed his general railroad policy and publicly endorsed
Sherwood's State Plan with some modifications. Pease was swayed by the
State Plan lobby to conclude that 1200 miles of road could be built with state
funds over the next several years, creating a public cost of $19,000,000 owed
to private investors. This deficit would be eradicated by an internal improvements tax, sale of public land, and by the appropriation of some of the money
obtained by the boundary settlement. Pease's new policy found few enthusiasts outside Galveston. Many interior Texans charged that Pease was in collusion with leading Galvestonians to enrich further the island's already fat
commercial interests. Other critics declared that "corporate promotion" such
as railroad building was not a proper function of the government, and that
similar projects not only failed in other states but in the process left behind a
legacy of corruption, fraud, and bitter intrastate rivalry. II
Despite public opposition. Pease remained committed to the State Plan
with his proposed revisions. He was willing to consider state aid to private
contractors if they were regulated properly. He rejected the idea of providing
state funds for miles of track completed. For a moment it appeared that State
Plan advocates were on the verge of victory when the Texas House's internal
improvements committee reported favorably on the proposal. Unfortunately,
that was the extent of their endorsement. Legislation sanctioning the state to
loan money or iron to railroad companies also was voted down, and the session came to an end on February 1, 1855, without any legislative consensus on
railroad policy. Pease was disturbed by the legislature's lack of initiative and
immediately announced he would call lawmakers back into session in JulyY
During the interim both State and Corporate Plan proponent~ lobbied
hard for their respective agendas. Lorenzo Sherwood urged Pease to reject his
opponent's claims that the State Plan was all but defeated, and that he should
continue being "discreetly active" in its behalf. Sherwood wa<;; confident that
with "proper exertion" the State plan would emerge victorious after the
summer session. Corporate lobbyists counseled Pease to abandon the state
system. They reminded the governor that his advocacy of the plan just a few
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months earlier nearly cost him reelection. They also impressed upon Pease the
fate of Sam Houston, who had destroyed himself politically by opposing the
Kansas-Nebraska Act contrary to his constituents' wishes. L'

It is doubtful that any Corporate Plan supporter was that familiar with
early socialist doctrine. They simply used the tenn for propaganda purposes in
their attacks on Sherwood and his plan. Sherwood was no socialist; yet to label
him as such created an image of an "outsider" trying to impose upon Texas
ideas that were antithetical and subversive to the Jacksonian creed of laissez
faire capitalism to which most Texans were devoted. In fairness to the
ccrporate faction. Sherwood's "political economy" not only was unorthodox
bLt woefully complex and cumbersome for the more pedestrian Jacksonian
economic mind. Corporators saw Sherwood's proposals as wasteful
expenditures of public money and felt the private sector could undertake the
prl)ject more efficiently.
The cornerstone of Sherwood's fiscal program for Texas was his assertion
that the institutions of banking and transportation should he founded upon the
state's great natural wealth -land - of which Texas had an abundance to offer
as security to both foreign and domestic investors for internal improvements.
Sh~rwood also contended that the federal honds presently sitting in the state
tre.:l.sury were equally attractive to investors. The notes could be used in conjunction with a carefully planned expenditure of the public domain to create a
viable credit base for banks and railroads. Sherwood believed once the state
est:lblished such policies, low-interest foreign loans for railroads and sound
paper for banking would flow into Texas as a "natural" result of such prudent
matlagement of state resources. Sherwood warned that jf the Corporators had
the-lr way, "our public lands, public money, and later the public credit would
be I~xhausted piecemeal, and the consequences would be the horrible, selfish
exploitation of the public domain and the corruption of legislators, governors,
and whomever else may fall victim to their falsehoods and deceptions."'4
Sherwood also contended that the general concept of incorporation as it
had evolved in the 1850s had brought "nothing but disorder and conflict." If
Texans hoped to prevent the Corporators from taking control of the state "with
their slander and machinations," then the people must be willing to create a
state-regulated system of finance and internal improvements. Sherwood
insi~;ted that all corporate property should be regulated by law to accept
liabJity for the acts of its agents. "Let us adopt a constitutional provision
making the stockholders in all corporations, created for business profit,
personally responsible for the debts of the company; and we would have no
mor\~ trouble from them than we would from mosquitoes or horse flies, when
the mercury stood at zero." Sherwood always closed his editorials and public
addresses by reminding his audience that the fate of Texas banking and
tran~,portation was ultimately in their hands. The people were "the one arena,
the one tribunal on earth where it is possible to cheek its (the corporation's)
oveqTowth and awe it into subjection and decency."15
The Corporators found a particularly receptive forum for their campaign
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against Sherwood in the editorial columns of the Houston Telegraph. The
paper's editor, E.H. Cushing, was one of the faction's most determined and
vitriolic members. In numerous editorials Cushing attacked Sherwood and the
State Plan from every possible angle, even accusing the New Yorker of using
his program for personal gain. "How much money do Sherwood and his
disciples expect to get out of the State Plan? If Mr. Sherwood's ideas were ever
to become a reality, all manner of corruption would be introduced into the
Legislative body." Cushing was convinced that state funds would be
"squandered in reckless and extravagant expenditure," and that it would be
impossible to determine "who of Sherwood's lackeys would be on the receiving end of this endeavoT."'6
Despite the attacks by Cushing and others, the project remained popular
with most Galvestonians and with a majority of mainland Texans who had
been suspicious of promoters from the outset. Most Texans were more
interested in getting the lines operating than in securing a profit or advantage
from their construction. Sherwood further augmented his growing support by
vigorously exploiting his talents as an extremely skillful and scholarly
debator whose knowledge of economics and public transportation, especially
railroads, was overwhelming. Together with his invaluable ally, publisher
Willard Richardson of the Galveston News, the New Yorker appeared invincible. Richardson's paper enjoyed one of the widest circulations in the
state, and through it Sherwood broadly dis~eminated his views. Between
April and July 1856, Sherwood, Richardson, and other State Plan advocates
filled the News with spirited commentaries. As summer approached, the
Corporate faction concluded that if Sherwood was not silenced their Loan
Bill would fail. The Corporator's anxiety intensified when Governor Pease
publicly endorsed Sherwood's agenda. With such support a State Plan victory
seemed inevitable.
If there was one area where Shewood was vulnerable it was on the issue
of slavery - a subject on which he was portrayed as having "unsound"
attitudes. In the fall of 1855 Sherwood publicly debated Louis T. Wigfall, a
rabid secessionist, and long-time Texas politico and "southron," Dr. Ashbel
Smith. It was from the context of that discussion that the Loan men based their
accusations. By June 1856, Sherwood was called a "Negro-loving abolitionist,
a low cunning political viper," who secretly was being "pensioned by his
Northern allies to help spread their incendiary doctrine of negro abolitionism
across Texas." Sherwood was a "Northern intruder" whose "years of study had
enabled him to tell lies with statistics." No matter how legitimate Sherwood's
agenda might be, no Texan should listen to a man who failed to take "a sound
Southern tone on slavery." It was time for loyal Texans to "strip the false
hearted pretensions to public welfare paraded" by an individual who was
"really a negro-loving abolitionist." 17 The Houston Telegraph went so far as to
question the southernism of Galvestonians, whom, it declared, "astonished"
other Texans by their support of the "insidious machinations and other acts of
humbuggery by Sherwood on railroad matters." If Islanders did not rid
themselves of Sherwood, they would be confirming in the minds of loyal
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Texans that Galvestonians were not to be "trusted," for they had "forsaken
their Southern heritage" and joined the ranks of Sherwood's abolitionists.'R
To what degree Sherwood wao;; genuinely "unsound" on the issues of
s. avery, secession, and the African slave trade was moot. Closer scrutiny of the
October debate between Smith, Wigfall, and Sherwood revealed that the New
Yorker was opposed to !\Iavery's expansion but not the institution. Sherwood
made it perfectly clear that he had "no desire to interfere with the institution
iT. States where it now existed." Moreover, living in the South had convinced
Sjlerwood "that there was much that was good in the institution of slavery-it
is neither all black nor aU white." Any decision to abolish slavery "must come
fDrn the people in their sovereign capacity," and Southerners must never be
"threatened with the use of force in order to have them relinquish their slaves."
Sherwood even believed that most slaveholders and Southern whites in
g(:neral '''never pretended to vindicate slavery in the abstract." It was an "evil"
thlt had been "introduced without the fault of the present generation:'
Sherwood, however, admitted that he would be "most gratified" if slavery was
abolished. Although Sherwood was willing to tolerate slavery as a temporary
labor system, human bondage was unacceptable as a permanent institution
because of the incongruity it represented for a democratic society. Sherwood
sa'.v the reopening of the African slave trade as the "conspiracy of a few
fanatics and mercenaries" who not only hoped to profit from the sale of human
flesh, but to perpetuate as well a labor system that denigrated "all white men"
anj kept the South "a backward and isolated region."l~
Sherwood was not alone in his opposition to the reopening of the trade.
Ot1er prominent Galvestonians and Texans also tried to block legislation that
we.uld resurrect "an evil piracy," as Judge John H. Reagan called it. Joining
Sh~rwood in a coalition to "silence this reckless discussion," were fellow
Galvestonians Judge James Love, Oscar Farish, Ferdinand Flake, editor of the
German weekly Die Union. Hamilton Stuart, editor of the Galveston Civilian,
and Judge Peter Gray of Houston. These individuals challenged every argument in favor of the trade, even the assertion that reopening of the slave trade
would "make good Christians of them (the Africans) and raise them to the
level of our negroes. The work is one of philanthropy and patriotism."20 That
the federal laws against the trade were "impeding God's work," Hamilton
Stuart replied "that no greater insult could be made upon the intelligence of the
People of Texas than that recently made in the Telegraph, that the importing
of Africans would be their Salvation. Any church going Texan who believes
thaI the reopening of the slave trade would Christianize African negroes, has
suc:umbed to a double-faced plea of self-interest among slave traders and
planters whose only concern is for individual profit."21
On the question of secession Sherwood was a staunch Unionist. He
warned Southerners "not to take a position so novel and ultra that it cannot be
measured by the Constitution." There were "fourteen million" Northerners
who opposed "any such talk" and would be ready "to defend the Constitution
and the rights of the Federal Government to preserve and enforce its laws. "22
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Sherwood was a supremely self-confident individual who refused to succumb
to "such blackhearted falsehoods." He dramatically and cogently defended his
position in public forums and deflected his critics' every invective. The more
he was denounced as an abolitionist, the more determined Sherwood was not
to capitulate. He accused his adversaries of making" 'nigger politics' your
tilting ground. Will you tell the people what that has to do with the Internal
Improvements Policy of the State? The People know I am no negrophile and
that I am as loyal to the State as even the oldest of men who have resided here
since its inception." Sherwood's critics ignored his queries and continued
calling him "a wise-acre and a nigger lover," asserting that Texans would
never agree with him either on his "nigger politics" or on his State Plan. "Can't
you take a hint and leave?" Sherwood countered by telling Texans that his
chief "pettifoggers" were "Loan men" whose sense of honor and decency has
been so corrupted by their desire for profit that "they will engage in the most
vile endeavors to have their way." If the Corporators "reckless schemes" were
"fastened upon the People and Legislature," they would then bilk the state
treasury "in order to make their worthless paper good."H
Since Sherwood refused to abandon his campaign for his railroad plan,
the Corporators concluded that the only way to defeat the State Plan and pass
their own was to force Sherwood to resign from the state legislature. The
Corporators agreed that the most expedient means of accomplishing that
objective was to intimidate Sherwood's disciples into withdrawing their prostate support. By accusing Sherwood of being an abolitionist and an arrant
traitor to Southern principles, the Corporators hoped to destroy his support
among various groups of Texans, whom they hoped would abandon Sherwood
for fear of being labeled disloyal as well. The Corporators extended their
epithets to include anyone associated with "this intruder from the North." The
Corporators also wanted to make sure that Sherwood would have '''restricted''
opportunities to address public gatherings. 24
Sherwood was aware of his opponents' strategy. Hoping to counter their
plan of removing him from the legislature, Sherwood and his more loyal
supporters - those friends who had not been shaken by the charges of
abolitionism - called for a meeting on the Island on July 7, 1856, to give
Sherwood the opportunity to defend his railroad plan and answer his critics. 2S
The Loan men realized that their bill's only chance of being enacted was
to prevent Sherwood from addressing the people of Galveston. They had bur
one day to rally their forces. They wasted no time in formulating a plan. On
the morning of July 7 a meeting of "concerned citizens" was "convened to take
into consideration the propriety of permitting Lorenzo Sherwood to address
the people in defense of his course in the last legislature." Although the
Corporators tried to conceal their true motive behind the facade of "public
concern," the purpose of this special convocation was to censure Lorenzo
Sherwood. After explaining to the audience why the meeting was called,
William Pitt Ballinger read a letter he had drafted to Sherwood, which he
would deliver to "this intruder from New York." Ballinger's message was a
demand for Sherwood's resignation for the legislature. 26
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Ballinger made it clear to Sherwood in his ultimatum that he "was not
acting alone" and that he had the full support of not just prominent Galvestonians but of a "good number" of Texans throughout the state who were as
(oncerned "as we are here of your lack of Southern principles." Ballinger
warned Shen.\lood that "neither you. nor anyone entertaining your views"
would be allowed to address the public "either directly or indirectly on the
subject of slavery." Ballinger declared that Sherwood's opinions on slavery,
"whether expressed in a private or public setting," would no longer be
tolerated. Sherwood already had "tried the patience" of Texans on the issue,
and it was obvious he had "no congeniality with them on that question."
E allinger recognized that Sherwood had "some supporters in this community,"
but if he attempted to test the situation by trying to discuss slavery before a
Calveston audience, then "the people of this City will come forth and make
this evening the occasion for the definite and final settlement of that issue)
both as to you and to them.)' Ballinger concluded his message by reminding
S!lerwood that any subsequent statements pertaining to slavery would be "'the
prompt signal for consequences to which we need not allude. "17
After Ballinger's message was approved by fellow Corporators,
Billinger, Samuel May Williams, Benjamin C. Franklin, and Colonel Ephraim
McLean delivered the ultimatum to the "intruder.') The committee told
Sherwood that if after reading Ballinger's letter, he attempted to hold his
meeting, he would be "visited" where he was speaking and "all possible
m~ans" would be "exercised to prevent you from addressing the people of
Galveston."28 The Corporators' stratagem was to make it appear that Sherwood
only was being denied the right to !o\peak on the issue of slavery. By focusing
on Sherwood's alleged "abolitionist beliefs," which Ballinger claimed his
message was preventing Sherwood from propagating, the Corporators created
the impression that Sherwood's right of free speech was not being violated
be;;ause he was still "allowed" to address other subjects.
At this critical juncture Sherwood's most important and loyal ally,
Wi lliard Richardson of the Galveston News. repudiated his old friend and

codeaguc. Richardson's defection was a fatal blow to Sherwood's cause and
the Corporators were delighted. For several days prior to the meeting, the
Corporators has tried to persuade Richardson to abandon Sherwood by
reninding the editor that his support had caused many Galvestonians "to
suspect your loyalty to Southern principles." It was time for Richardson to
decide whether he was "a true and devoted son of the South and all that it
sta1ds for." or whether he had "betrayed" his heritage and had allied himself
"w;.th this Northern abolitionist and socialist."2~ Even though Richardson
endorsed Sherwood's railroad policies, he always made it clear that he
opposed the New Yorker's stand on slavery. Despite publicly denouncing
She:rwood's position on slavery, Richardson realized that continued support of
his railroad agenda could cause the financial ruin of his paper. The last thing
Richardson wanted was to be the next recipient of one of the elite's "vigilance"
lett(~rs. To abandon so abruptly Sherwood at this crucial moment was a painful
decision for Richardson. Nonetheless, when confronted with the reality of
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economic and political survival, Richardson chose the secure and practical
rather than the idealistic course.
The response of Hamilton Stuart. editor of the Galveston Civilian, to this
same crisis was dramatically different. Although opposing Sherwood
throughout the decade on a variety of issues, Stuart believed that the censuring
was morally wrong. Stuart was not known for his boldness of action; yet he
came forward and defended Sherwood's right of free speech. Stuart also led a
group of citizens in protest from the meeting. Later, it was Stuart's Civilian
and not Richardson's News that published and distributed Sherwood's
explanation of his views."JO
Confronted with either submission or possible physical reprisal, Sherwood concluded that "wisdom was the better part of valor" and resigned as
Galveston's delegate to the state legislature. Although defeated, Sherwood was
determined not to allow his "course to be misconstrued." In a broadside
printed by Stuart, Sherwood wanted it known that "for the peace and hannony
of the community" he was willing to "waive for the present, the vindication of
myself against the attacks of all those who have opposed me on this issue."31
For a brief moment it appeared that Sherwood and his supporters would
receive prompt vindication. Ignoring Sherwood's request to let the matter die,
his most loyal followers retaliated against the Corporators by circulating a
petition on the island demanding that State Senator M.M. Potter, one of
Sherwood's most vitriolic critics, publicly "clarify" his stand on the railroad
controversy_ The petition placed Potter in a compromising position: he recently was elected to the legislature based on his support of the Galveston
plan. Williard Richardson earlier had proposed an idea that became known as
the "Galveston plan" which maintained that the contours of Texas geography,
especially the Gulf Coast, "necessitated" a fanlike convergence of all Texas
lines to Galveston. Richardson did not particularly care whether such a system
was built by private or public funds. But as Sherwood's friends revealed,
Potter and others, all supposed advocates of the Galveston plan, for several
months had assisted private railroad interests as lobbyists, "throwing money
around in Austin in hopes of securing contracts for railroad builders out of
New York." As James Love confided to Thomas Jack, "Potter & the others are
acting foolishly - they throw themselves at the feet of these moguls from N. Y.
as if they were some sort of royalty. It is disgracefuL The Govr. is very wary
of these men and I don't believe any contracts will be forthcoming for them."
The funds Potter and his associates dispensed were provided by Robert Walker
and T. Butler King, who had reorganized the old Atlantic and Pacific Railroad
Company into the Texas Western, and now pressed hard for a charter to build
an east-west line through the state. 31
Potter was not about to let Sherwood get the best of him. He quickly
counterattacked by condemning the petition as one more "purulent" attempt
by the "abolitionist and socialist" Sherwood to impose his ideas upon ..the
unsuspecting and honest people of Texas." Potter shrewdly declared that he
"forgave" those Galvestonians who signed the petition because they were
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unaware that "its design was to once more vilify all those who had opposed
his (Sherwood's) radical schemes to bring down upon our State, corruption,
extravagance, and abolitionism. ".1.1
The final blow to the State Plan was Governor Elisha M. Pease's decision
that continued endorsement in the face of Sherwood's censorship in Galveston
could prove politically suicidal. Now that Sherwood was silenced by me
Corporators, the State Plan was dead and Pease could withdraw his support
without losing credibility. With Sherwood out of the way, when the legislature
reconvened that summer it quickly passed a bill loaning railroad companies
~~6,000 of United States bonds in the permanent school fund for every mile of
road built to assist further construction. Pease allowed the measure to become
law without his signature. On August 13, 1856 the Loan Bill became law.
Henceforth Texas railroads would be built by private enterprise generously
aided by the state.3~
By using the slavery issue the Corporators succeeded in destroying their
ablest antagonist. As the experience uf Lorenzo Sherwood confirmed, by the
1,~50s men who in any way questioned the "sanctity" of slavery were destined
teo suffer all manner of public humiliation, censorship, ostracism, and even
death in extreme cases. From the moment he arrived from New York in 1846,
Sherwood was viewed to be outside the political and cultural mainstreams of
Texas society. Despite his statements to the contrary, by the ti.me of the
railroad controversy Sherwood's "northemism" made him vulnerable to his
acversaries' charges of abolitionism and disloyalty to the South. No matter
how forthright and sound the individual and his ideas, if they were perceived
to threaten any aspect of Southern life or values, they would be subject to the
sa me sort of reprisals as any other traitor to Southern communities. The
ce rrsoring of Lorenzo Sherwood in 1856 was clearly the manifestation of
Texans' identification with the Lower South ethos of the late 1850s and its
ag.~ressive vigilance to purge from Southern society all individuals and ideas
th,\t in any way challenged the virtue of Southern social, economic, and
po.'.itical institutions.
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